tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4992542558446504317.post225844012946627113..comments2020-07-31T08:27:59.130-07:00Comments on Skrignov's Corner: Reframing Ethics: Our Perspective on Sin and Its ConsequencesSkrignovhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17628791954692813183noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4992542558446504317.post-41446070854765311762011-04-22T12:42:21.702-07:002011-04-22T12:42:21.702-07:00If God and Goodness were in fact different, then w...If God and Goodness were in fact different, then we would be required to say that God is subservient to something other than Himself. If then, He would not be God – not, at least, in the normal way we define God. <br /><br />I think you have two separate issues, Hephæstus. Both of them are worthwhile. However, I think both are completely and logically answerable.<br /><br />You say that to call them (God and Goodness) the same is to fall into the arbitrary problem. However, from a Christian theological perspective, this is not the case. God is existence; existence is not arbitrary. The nature of God and Goodness is simply that of life, of existence, of reality. There is nothing arbitrary about that. Evil, or that which is not of God, does not have existence in its own right. It’s not as if God’s nature is one of many things, and so things that are good are things that are reflective of this one among many natures. No, God’s nature is the only nature, for it the nature of existence, the nature of all metaphysics. <br /><br />Second, you say that even if God’s nature is Goodness, then He is bound to act by it and not anything else – and therefore, he is bound by something other than Himself. But I think my previous theological outline above (not that it was done well) helps show the flaw in this. To say that God is bound to act by the nature of existence and reality is only “limiting” in a semantic sense. There really is no limit here. It’s like saying that the mathematical set “infinity” is limited because it doesn’t include things from the set “not infinity.” This isn’t truly limiting.<br /><br />I think your issues here, as are mine, are discussing ideas relating to God. The idea of God is unlike anything we discuss in human terms. And this isn’t a “cop out;” instead, it simply has to do with dealing with something that doesn’t conform to ourselves. It’s like discussing things beyond three dimensions. Reality exists beyond the three dimensions we can sense; but we don’t experience it as such, therefore it always seems abstract and otherworldly. But it doesn’t make it untrue<br /><br />However, I don’t think this means that our discussions of God are illogical or unreasonable. Quite the contrary, I think all of the theological foundations of our ideas of God are completely and fundamentally logical and reasonable. They take us outside of our realms of normal thought – and perhaps they supersede logic and reason, at least our limited way of viewing logic and reason – but they don’t contradict our understanding of logic and reason.Jonashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01907857891682323709noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4992542558446504317.post-13674857983160099722011-04-22T11:18:16.778-07:002011-04-22T11:18:16.778-07:00Jonas, well constructed post I enjoyed the read ve...Jonas, well constructed post I enjoyed the read very much. I may have more to suggest or ask about later but for the moment I am interested in the solution to Euthyphro.<br /><br />I have heard the argument that piety (or maybe goodness?) can be reconciled to God through the assignment of it to his nature. I have always wondered about it though; doesn't that solution amount to little more than just renaming terms?<br /><br />I have a hard time seeing the resolution here. So what if God's nature is goodness, Is he not still bound to it in the same way he would be if it were a nebulous “other”. How is saying “God commands things because His nature is goodness” different from “”God commands things because goodness demands it”? If this nature is not 'higher' than God and he is his nature then why is goodness not arbitrary?2<br /><br />Perhaps the issue is just in my understanding of Nature, but it seems that if you make the two things (goodness and God) one and the same, you are back at arbitrary. To call them different is to say that God is bound by something higher. Either goodness is God or it is different than God how can it be both?Monastic Panichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17746312340359549943noreply@blogger.com